

Table 1

Logistical Support for the Current Communist Main Force a/
in South Vietnam Under the Current Scale of Combat b/

Class of Supply	Total Logistical Resupply Requirements			Logistical Resupply Requirements from Abroad <u>c/</u>		
	VC	PAVN	TOTAL	VC	PAVN	TOTAL
Class I (Food)	29.25	5.5	34.75	—	—	—
Class II and IV (including weapons)	1.17	2.75	3.92	1.17	2.75	3.92
Class III (POL)	—	1.26	1.26	—	1.26	1.26
Class V (Ammunition)	11.76	12.75	24.51	1.76	2.75	4.51
	32.18	12.26	44.44	2.93	6.76	9.69
Total	====	====	=====	====	====	=====

a. 139 battalions (117 VC, 22 PAVN) of 500 men each.

b. Each battalion engaged in combat once every 35 days.

c. Requirements to be computed under terms of agreement used in providing these estimates in the Annex to SNIE 10-12.

NB: The Current Communist Main Force consists of 58,450 VC and 11,050 PAVN, converted into battalion equivalents of 117 VC battalions and 22 PAVN battalions of 500 men each.

DIA review(s) completed.

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Table 2

Logistical Support for the Current Communist Main Force a/
in South Vietnam Under the Intermediate Scale of Combat b/

Class of Supply	Total Logistical Resupply Requirements			Logistical Resupply Requirements From Abroad <u>c/</u>		
	VC	PAVN	Total	VC	PAVN	Total
Class I (Food)	58.5	11.0	69.5	—	—	—
Class II and IV (including weapons)	5.85	16.5	22.35	5.85	16.5	22.35
Class III (POL)	9.35*	9.35*	9.35*	—	9.35*	9.35*
Class V (Ammunition)	35.38	11.0	46.38	35.38	11.0	46.38
Total	99.73	38.5	138.23	41.23	27.5	68.73
	====	====	=====	====	====	=====
		47.85*	147.58*		36.85*	78.08*

- a. 139 (117 VC, 22 PAVN) battalions of 500 men each.
b. Each battalion engaged in combat once every 7 days.
c. Requirements to be computed under terms of agreement used in providing these estimates in the Annex to SNIE 10-12.

NB: The Current Communist Main Force consists of 58,450 VC and 11,050 PAVN, converted into battalion equivalents of 117 VC battalions and 22 PAVN battalions of 500 men each.

* The J2 MACV briefing to the SECDEF on 26 Nov 65 omitted CI III "for infiltration as we have accounted for it in our LOC capacities." ~~17~~

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Table 3

Logistical Support for the Expanded Communist Main Force a/
in South Vietnam Under Light Combat Conditions b/

Short Tons Per Day						
Class of Supply	Total Logistical Resupply Requirements			Logistical Resupply Requirements From Abroad c/		
	VC	PAVN	Total	VC	PAVN	Total
Class I (Food)	<u>53.0</u>	<u>24.5</u>	<u>77.5</u>	—	—	—
Class II and IV (including weapons)	<u>6.62</u>	<u>36.75</u>	<u>43.37</u>	<u>6.62</u>	<u>36.75</u>	<u>43.37</u>
Class III (POL)	—	<u>20.82</u>	<u>20.82</u>	—	<u>20.82</u>	<u>20.82</u>
Class V (Ammunition)	<u>88.78</u>	<u>67.38</u>	<u>156.16</u>	<u>88.78</u>	<u>67.38</u>	<u>156.16</u>
	<u>148.40</u>	<u>149.45</u>	<u>297.85</u>	<u>95.40</u>	<u>124.95</u>	<u>220.35</u>
Total	====	====	=====	====	====	=====

A. 155 (106 VC, 49 PAVN) battalions of 500 men each.

b. Each battalion engaged in combat once every 3 days.

c. Requirements to be computed under terms of agreement used in providing these estimates in the Annex to SNIN 10-12.

Approved For Release 2003/05/14 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000200110004-3

Requirement # 3A (Ref. III. A., Terms of Reference)

Due to CIA: 28 Jan 1966

<u>Fixed Targets</u>	<u>SORTIES</u>					<u>ORDNANCE</u>			
<u>Strikes</u>	<u>Scheduled/ARM</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Abort</u>	<u>Alternate Target</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>On Target</u>	<u>Off Target</u>	<u>Jettison</u>
Tgt. No.									

Approved For Release 2003/05/14 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000200110004-3

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Requirement # 3A (Continued)

<u>Fixed Targets</u>	<u>Strikes</u>	<u>ENEMY REACTION</u>			<u>US LOSSES</u>			
		<u>Groundfire</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>SAMS</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>		<u>Pilots</u>	
					<u>Enemy</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Lost</u>	<u>Recovered</u>

Approved For Release 2003/05/14 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000200110004-3

Requirement # 3A (Continued)

<u>Fixed Targets</u>	<u>Strikes</u>	<u>RESULTS</u>				<u>OBSTACLES</u>		
		PI	%	PI	PI			
		<u>Destroyed/PR</u>	<u>Damaged/PR</u>	<u>Missed</u>	<u>PR</u>	<u>Weather</u>	<u>Legal</u>	<u>Other</u>

Approved For Release 2003/05/14 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000200110004-3

Requirements # 3B (Ref. III. A., Terms of Reference)

Due to CIA: 28 Jan 1966

Armed Reconnaissance

<u>Strikes</u>	
<u>Approved</u>	<u>Flown</u>

<u>Sorties</u>	
<u>Number</u>	<u>/ ARM</u>

Target or Object

For each Rolling
Thunder Program

Approved For Release 2003/05/14 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000200110004-3

Requirements # 3B (Continued)

Armed Reconnaissance

Results						Ordnance Expended	
<u>Bridge</u>	<u>LOC</u>	<u>Truck</u>	<u>Loco</u>	<u>Bldg. (Type)</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Amounts</u>

Approved For Release 2003/05/14 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000200110004-3

Requirements # 3B (Continued)

Armed Reconnaissance

<u>Enemy Reaction</u>			<u>Obstacles</u>		
<u>Ground Fire</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Sams</u>	<u>Legal</u>	<u>Weather</u>	<u>Other</u>

Approved For Release 2003/05/14 : CIA-RDP78S02149R000200110004-3

Requirement #4 (Ref: III. B and C., Terms of Reference)

1. J-3 is requested to provide a statement outlining those factors which precondition the nature and scale of attacks under the Rolling Thunder (RT) program. This statement should include discussion of the area limitations imposed on the RT program; the policy guidance which controls the choice of targets; the casualty criteria which are used, particularly the limit of projected casualties which results in disapproval of projected programs. (III. B. of Terms of Reference.)

2. The discussion should also include an assessment of the over-target capability of in-being air forces in Thailand, South Vietnam, air carrier forces, and B-52 forces in Okinawa. (III. C. of Terms of Reference.)

Deadline to CIA -- 28 Jan 1966

Requirement 5. Assessment of Rolling Thunder
(Reference: IV.A.B.C. of Terms of Reference)

I. Fixed Targets

Request the following information on all strikes and restrikes against fixed military targets in the DRV from March through December 1965 furnished in the following manner.

A. Please compile both strikes and restrikes in chronological order by month from March through December 1965.

B. The monthly information should include:

1. Target number and date or dates of attack.
2. Target name.
3. Brief description of the target in terms of both physical dimensions and the importance of the facility to the military.
4. Damage inflicted on the target in terms of:
 - a. Actual physical damage i.e. - number of buildings destroyed, square feet of buildings destroyed.
 - b. Impact of the target's damage or destruction on the military effort.
5. Estimate of the cost of damage inflicted on each military target in terms of restoration costs and the replacement of destroyed and damaged inventory.

6. Pre and post-strike estimates of the military and civilian casualties resulting from the first strike on each target. Differentiate between each.

7. Estimate of the military and civilian casualties resulting from the succeeding strikes on each target. Differentiate between military and civilian casualties.

II. Armed Reconnaissance Targets

A. Provide information for each Rolling Thunder program as follows:

1. Total missions and sorties launched against one of the following area subdivisions listed in descending order of preference, but only one form of reporting should be used:

- a. Individual routes, or
- b. Navy route designation areas, or
- c. Provinces, or
- d. Military regions.

2. Total ordnance expended by each Rolling Thunder program in the same format reported under II.A.1., above.

3. Total damage inflicted by each Rolling Thunder program reported in II.A.1., by armed reconnaissance i.e. - bridges, trucks, barges, ferries, huts, etc.

4. An estimate of casualties resulting from armed reconnaissance missions.

III. Evaluation of Sources

A. Please identify and evaluate sources used in parts I and II, above, to estimate physical damage and casualties.

Deadline to CIA: 28 January 1966

Requirement 6. The Logistics Target System
(Reference: Section V.B, 1-4 of Terms of Reference)

DIA and J-3 are requested to provide the following:

1. Details of existing LOC target systems spelling out operations against LOC "choke-points" that would inflict physical damage sufficient to reduce the capacity of the DRV logistic routes (rail, highway, water) to a point where they cannot meet the requirements of Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Three levels of logistic requirements are to be considered:

- a. The present level of forces and existing scale of combat (daily tonnage as determined by Requirement 1).
- b. The present level of forces at escalated scale of combat with each battalion engaged once in 7 days.
- c. A level of forces of 155 battalions at a scale of combat with each battalion engaged once in 3 days.

2. The target system should apply to at least the following routes:

- a. Railroad and routes 1A and 15 south of the Thanh Hoa area.
- b. Coastal and inland water routes south of Hoang Mai.
- c. All transport routes between Vinh or the coast and the Tan Ap area on route 15.

d. All connections between routes 15 and 101 and the routes in Laos.

e. Laotian routes 12, 23, 911, 92, and 96.

f. Any other routes considered to be significant in supplying Laos or South Vietnam.

3. It is desired that the targets be presented in tabular form, giving the following information for each target: Target number, Name, Location, Description, Estimate of Effect of Destruction. To accompany each listing, an estimate of the effort (ordnance, sorties, strikes) that would be required to reduce the capacity of the routes to the desired level, or the maximum destruction judged attainable. Provide also an estimate of restrikes and frequency of restrikes necessary to maintain reduction in capacity.

4. Provide existing studies on feasibility and objectives to be achieved by aerial mining of ports in North Vietnam. Provide also detailed data on strikes, sorties, ordnance, etc. for initial mining and necessary restrikes.

5. An estimate of capabilities and requirements (present and future) to interdict: a) personnel infiltration over land trails; b) infiltration along inland waterways; c) sea or coastal infiltration movements.

6. A comparison of these target systems with those used in the attacks carried out in 1965.

Deadline to CIA: 28 January 1966

Requirement #7 (Ref: V. C. 5, Terms of Reference)

1. J-3 is requested to provide an assessment of the strike capability needed to immobilize all of the target systems discussed in section V. C. of the terms of reference. This assessment should assume the immobilization of these target systems (using all available attack resources, including B-52's) to be accomplished by the end of calendar year 1966. The following factors should be considered:

- a. Required build-up of forces
- b. Ordnance requirements
- c. The logistics problem -- bases, personnel, materials
- d. Time phasing of the acquisition of required over-target capabilities
- e. Time phasing of the air attack on target systems

2. If the assessment indicates that the requisite capability cannot be reached by the end of calendar 1966, assess the following:

- a. The capability that would be achieved by end 1966
- b. The degree to which these target systems could be immobilized with actual end 1966 capabilities
- c. The time-phasing in implementing 2b.

3. An assessment of the capability required to immobilize each of these target systems separately.

Deadline to CIA: 28 Jan. 1966

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